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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment converges at the intersection of Constitutional Law and 
Climate Law.  It seeks to explore six various jurisprudential perspectives
and juridical decision-making models in their application to the modern
threat of climate change.  Based in some part on Professor Christopher 
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Stone’s seminal work Should Trees Have Standing? and Professor Roy
Brooks’ book Structures of Judicial Decision Making from Legal 
Formalism to Critical Theory, I attempt to provide insight and new lenses 
by which the legal scholar may view the legal debate on climate change.
I first digest, through six judicial perspectives, a rather important climate
law Supreme Court case that first broke the mold of traditional “standing”
doctrine.  The underlying values and crucial subtext of the various “Justices”
are spoken into and through their perspectives in a quasi-judicial voice.  I 
then critique these perspectives to challenge their implications and 
consequences.  And last, I comment on a recent Ninth Circuit case directly
on point that illustrates the conflict and tension between structural
Constitutional doctrine and judicial desire for a living Document for an
evolving world environment.  We begin in 2007.
II. MASSACHUSETTS V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
A. Traditional Perspectives
A group of private organizations petitioned the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)1 to begin regulating the emissions of four greenhouse gases, 
including carbon dioxide, under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.2  The
petition was based on respected scientific opinions that a well-documented 
rise in global temperatures and attendant climatological and environmental 
changes have resulted from a significant increase in the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases.3 
The EPA ultimately denied the petition, reasoning that (1) the Clean Air
Act does not authorize it to issue mandatory regulations to address global
climate change, and (2) even if the agency had the authority to set greenhouse 
gas emission standards, it would have been “unwise to do so at that time,” 
because a causal link between greenhouse gases and the increase in global 
surface air temperatures was not “unequivocally established.”4 
1.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (“The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . .
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class . . . of new motor 
vehicles . . . which in [the EPA Administrator’s] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air 
pollution . . . reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”). 
3. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505, 510; see 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (defining “air pollutant” to
include “any air pollution agent . . ., including any physical, chemical . . . substance . . . emitted 
into . . . the ambient air”). 
4. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511–13. 
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Petitioners were later joined by Massachusetts and other state and local 
governments and sought review in the D.C. Circuit.5 A majority of the D.C. 
Circuit panel agreed that the EPA Administrator properly exercised his 
discretion in denying the rulemaking petition.6  But the circuit court’s
reasoning was a three-way tie.  One judge concluded that the Administrator’s 
exercise of discretion was proper without addressing the question of 
standing.7  Another found that standing was lacking but concurred on the 
merits that the Administrator was within his discretion.8  A third judge 
dissented, finding that standing was proper and that the EPA administrator 
had failed to operate within his discretion.9 Based on the concurrence, the 
court denied review of the petition.10 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on two issues.
First, the Court held that petitioners have standing to challenge the EPA’s 
denial of their rulemaking petition.11  To demonstrate standing, a litigant
must show that it has suffered: (1) a concrete and particularized injury that 
is either actual or imminent, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the 
defendant, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress that injury.12 
The Court further elaborated that Congress can “accord[] a procedural 
right to protect [the] concrete interests” of citizens to vitiate standing by 
statute.13 The Court distinguished the special position of Massachusetts as
a sovereign, and noted that States have sovereign prerogatives over the 
territory allegedly affected.14 Furthermore, the exercise of the police power 
5. Id. at 514; see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which specifies review of the EPA 
Administrator’s discretion is within the purview of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
 6. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 514. 
7. Id.
 8. Id. at 514–15. 
9. Id. at 515–16; Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, 
J., dissenting) (reasoning that the petitioners adequately supported the conclusion that the 
EPA’s failure to curb greenhouse gas emissions contributed to the sea level changes that 
threatened Massachusetts’ coastal property and that a redress requiring a reduction in 
emissions would delay the adverse impacts of global warming), rev’d 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
10. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 514. 
11. Id. at 517. 
12. Id.; See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating the actual cases and controversies 
requirement); see also Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
13. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572, n.7). 
14. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (distinguishing from Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 
where a private individual brought the claim, explaining it was of “considerable relevance” the 
party seeking review was a sovereign State); id. at 518–19 (holding that Massachusetts has an 
independent, sovereign interest in the preservation of its territory, supporting federal 
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to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions was now lodged in the 
Federal Government, and the States must have a means of redress.15 
Because Congress has ordered the EPA to protect Massachusetts by
prescribing applicable emissions standards,16 and has given Massachusetts “a
concomitant procedural right” to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking 
petition as “arbitrary and capricious,”17 the majority held that the petitioners’
submissions have satisfied “the most demanding standards of the adversarial 
process.”18  The EPA’s “steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent,’”19 
and there is a “substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will 
prompt the EPA to take steps to reduce that risk.20 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated, “The harms associated 
with climate change are serious and well recognized.”21 “That these changes
are widely shared does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome 
of this litigation.”22  “Given [the] EPA’s failure to dispute the existence
of a causal connection between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and 
global warming, its refusal to regulate such emissions, at a minimum, 
‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries.”23  “While regulating motor-vehicle
emissions may not by itself reverse global warming, it does not follow that 
the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether [the] EPA has a duty to take 
steps to slow or reduce it.”24 
jurisdiction) (“In that capacity [as a quasi-sovereign] the State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the
last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants 
shall breathe pure air.” (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907))). 
15. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (holding “[t]hat Massachusetts does in fact
own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected’ only reinforces the conclusion that 
its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise 
of federal judicial power.”).
16. Id. at 519–20; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
17. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
18. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521. 
19. Id. at 521; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
20. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521; see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63–68 (1978) (holding that Congress constitutionally limited 
liability of nuclear power plants to protect that private sector during development based 
on the remote possibility that the ceiling of liability would be reached in a single accident; 
relief remained available to parties, thus the law was not unconstitutional). 
21. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521. 
22. Id. at 522; see, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1998). 
23. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 499, 524; Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 66 (Tatel, J., 
dissenting) (“[The] EPA would presumably not bother with such efforts if it thought emissions 
reductions would have no discernable impact on future global warming”). 
24. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525; see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 
(1982) (“[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a 
94






   












   
[VOL. 12:  91, 2021] Judicial Perspectives
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
The Court held that the petitioners in this case had standing to challenge
the denial of their rulemaking petition with the EPA.25 
Second, the Court held that the EPA has statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gases and the agency should not abdicate its mandate to regulate.  
The Court noted the difference between an agency refusing to enforce a 
rule versus refusing to make a rule.26  The Court found that the EPA rejected
the rulemaking petition based on impermissible considerations and its actions 
were therefore “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law,”27 demanding that on remand, the EPA must “ground its reasons for 
action or inaction in the statute.”28 
In response to the EPA’s desire to postpone policy-making on greenhouse 
gases, the majority demanded that the agency take action, one way or the 
other: “[The] EPA’s alternative basis for its decision—that even if it has
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do 
so at this time—rests on reasoning divorced from the statutory text.”29 
“The statutory question is whether sufficient information exists for it to 
make an endangerment finding, and to that end the EPA has refused to 
comply with a clear statutory command.”30  On the question of the EPA’s 
favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself.  He need not show that a
favorable decision will relieve his every injury”).
25. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526. 
26.  Id. at 527. See infra note 56. 
27.  42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2007). 
28. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–35. See also id. at 500 (the Court elaborates 
“[b]ecause greenhouse gases fit well within the Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’ 
[the] EPA has statutory authority to regulate emission of such gases from new motor vehicles. 
That definition – which includes ‘any air pollution agent . . ., including any physical, chemical, . . . 
substance . . . emitted into . . . the ambient air . . .’ [the Clean Air Act] embraces all airborne 
compounds of whatever stripe. Moreover, carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are 
undoubtedly ‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s].’”). 
29. Id. at 532. See id. at 501 (“While the statute conditions EPA action on its
formation of a ‘judgment,’ that judgment must relate to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or 
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.’” (citing § 7601(a)(1)). 
30. Id. at 533–34 (explaining that “[u]nder the Act’s clear terms, [the] EPA can
avoid promulgating regulations only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not 
contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it 
cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. It has refused to do 
so, offering instead a laundry list of reasons not to regulate, including the existence of voluntary 
Executive Branch programs providing a response to global warming and impairment of 
the President’s ability to negotiate with developing nations to reduce emissions. These 
policy judgments have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to 
climate change and do not amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a 
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failing to fulfill its mandate, the Court held that “[t]he EPA has offered no
reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases 
cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore . . . not in 
accordance with the law.”31 
The ruling of the D.C. Circuit was reversed and remanded. 
1. Judicial Positivism 
The POSITIVIST JUSTICE, dissenting:
The Positivist school of thought concurs whole-heartedly with the 
dissent of the Chief Justice.32  Evaluation within our current system of
rules, both statutory and those derived from case law, are of the utmost 
importance and the Court should avoid any deviation from traditional 
canons of established textualist interpretation.  The majority in Massachusetts 
deviates sharply from clearly established justiciability doctrine precedent 
and blurs the lines in our separation of powers.  A positivist would 
vehemently dissent.
Global warming is not a problem that “has escaped the attention of 
policymakers in the Executive and Legislative Branches of our Government, 
who consider the regulatory, legislative, and treaty-based means of addressing 
global climate change.”33 Petitioners seek to use the judiciary as the vehicle
for instituting change that they consider to occur too slowly within “the 
functions of Congress and the Chief Executive.”34  The proper role of the
Court, which the majority now unabashedly rejects, is to adjudicate justiciable 
cases and controversies that have proper constitutional standing.35 Petitioners
failed to assert: (1) a particularized injury (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
allegedly unlawful conduct that is (3) likely to be addressed by the requested 
relief.36 
A particularized injury must be actual or imminent (not conjectural),37 
real and immediate,38 and certainly impending.39  Based on the evidence
scientific judgment. Nor can [the] EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the 
uncertainty surrounding various features of climate change and concluding that it would 
therefore be better not to regulate at this time. If the scientific uncertainty is so profound 
that it precludes [the] EPA from making a reasoned judgment, it must say so.” Id. at 501.). 
31. Id. at 534 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2007)). 
32. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.). 
33. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
34. See id.; See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. See  NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF 
YOU CAN KEEP IT 130–37 (N.Y. Crown Forum, 2019). 
35. But see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
36.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
37. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
38.  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 
39.  Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). 
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in the record, the alleged injury was not particularized.40  Apart from the
issue of Massachusetts, as a State claiming a particularized injury, the 
scientific data provided details nothing remotely conclusive.41  Petitioners
claim that Massachusetts will lose “significant state-owned coastal land[s]” 
over the next 100 years.42  Furthermore, the model used in that calculation 
hypothesizes a 20 to 70 cm rise in sea levels, with a maximum observed 
error of 70 cm.43  How the majority concludes that a calculation with an
inherent error equal to its maximum value satisfies the definition of imminence 
“taxes the credulity of the credulous.”44 
The same conclusion can be reached for causation and redressability, 
which are conventionally addressed together.  The fair traceability to the 
defendant’s alleged misconduct and validity of proposed relief are 
significantly lacking.  Can we really surmise that the EPA’s refusal to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions is the predominant cause of Massachusetts’ 
“injury”?  The problem of global warming is far too complex to even suggest 
that conclusion.45  Beyond the difficulties associated with explaining 
causal links, the challenge demonstrating that the EPA’s regulation would 
redress the injury is insurmountable.46  According to the petitioner’s own 
declarations, the proposed emissions standard regulations might reduce 
global emissions a “fraction of 4 percent.”47 The majority’s conclusion that
these causal links and redressability are sufficient to satisfy the elements 
of standing is as speculative as it is meritless. 
40. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 541–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The very
concept of global warming seems inconsistent with this particularization requirement. 
Global warming is a phenomenon ‘harmful to humanity at large,’ the redress petitioners 
seek is focused no more on them than on the public generally–it is literally to change 
the atmosphere around the world.” (quoting Massachusetts v. E.P.A. 415 F.3d 50, 60 
(C.A.D.C. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment))). 
41. Id. at 538–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] State asserting quasi-sovereign 
interests as parens patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III. . . . [O]ur cases 
cast significant doubt on a State’s standing to assert quasi-sovereign interest—as opposed 
to direct injury—against the Federal Government.” (rejecting the doctrine of parens patriae 
as a substitute for concrete injury and the majority’s reliance on Tennessee Copper Co.)).
See cases cited supra notes 14, 15. 
42. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added). 
43. Id. 
44.  Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
45. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
46. Id. at 542–43. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–16, 30–38, Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120). 
47. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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To its credit, the Court’s “special solitude” for Massachusetts limits the
extent to which this new standard of relaxed standing can be expanded in 
the future.48  Nonetheless, a positivist cannot abide by the Court’s flagrant 
disregard of precedent and the limited role that the judiciary has in our 
democratic society.  The Court is now untethered from the text of the 
Constitution and abandons the doctrine of stare decisis.49  Finding no 
basis for standing, the positivist need not comment on the Court’s policy-
dictation to the EPA, but the Pragmatist does so eloquently in the dissenting 
part of the following opinion. 
Today, the Court functions as a bench of politicians, not as judges.  The 
positivist dissents. 
2. Judicial Pragmatism 
The PRAGMATIST JUSTICE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
Pragmatism compels writing separately from the majority and the 
Positivist because although agreeing with the Court’s finding on standing, 
the Pragmatist cannot abide by the forced policymaking on the EPA.  On
that inquiry, Pragmatism agrees with Positivism, finding the majority 
violates the separation of powers doctrine.
First, a Pragmatist would hold that petitioners have standing to challenge
the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.  This case “suffers from 
none of the defects” that would preclude it from being a justiciable Article 
48. Id. at 548.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (establishing that “[the Federal Government]
shall, and a State may, take such measures, including . . . seeking injunctive relief, as 
necessary to [enforce the Clean Air Act]”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (establishing that private plaintiffs have standing 
to seek injunctive relief and civil damages for Clean Water Act violations); Citizens for 
Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2003) (establishing 
standing for citizens to allege procedural violations of the National Environmental Policy 
Act’s notice and comment requirements and the Endangered Species Act’s consultation 
and biological-assessment requirements); but see Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 741 F.3d 
1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., concurring) (in denying rehearing en banc, rejected 
the dissenting view that “[holding] that non-state entities categorically lack standing to use 
the Clean Air Act to compel state action on global warming—disregards Supreme Court 
precedent, makes bad law for our circuit, and harms the public”; refusing to expand the 
reasoning of Massachusetts to allow for suits by private, non-state entities; and holding 
“[Massachusetts] does nothing to restrict environmental litigation beyond those limitations 
already established by the Supreme Court. And the opinion leaves open the many doors 
that previously existed under our case law for governmental entities and private parties to 
litigate with respect to injuries resulting from global climate change.”); infra notes 136–51 
and accompanying texts. 
49. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2; see, e.g., Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). See also GORSUCH, 
supra note 34, at 121–25. 
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III “controvers[y].”50 To demonstrate standing, a litigant must show that
it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury, that is either actual or 
imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that a 
favorable decision will likely redress that injury.51 
The Pragmatist would agree that where Congress has “accord[ed] a
procedural right to protect [the] concrete interests” of citizens and Massachusetts 
has sovereign prerogatives over the territory affected, the exercise of 
police power to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, now lodged 
in the Federal Government, provides a means of redress.52 It is clear that 
Congress intended to provide a cause of action rooted in environmental 
protection policy, and a Pragmatist justice would no more than vindicate 
this normative value. 
Therefore, the Pragmatist would also agree that Massachusetts has a
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as 
arbitrary and capricious, that the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both actual and 
imminent, (to the extent necessary to vitiate standing) that refusal to 
regulate such emissions contributes to Massachusetts’ injuries, and that 
there is a “substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will 
prompt the EPA to take steps to reduce that risk.53 This is merely policy-
discovery; it is well established as an unarticulated norm that we should 
endeavor to protect the environment and sometimes that means that new 
rules and regulations must be made. When they are not made, clear public 
policy dictates that a procedure be available to redress the failure of an 
agency to perform as required by law.54 
50. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 498; see, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
51. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
52. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (concluding that Massachusetts has an independent,
sovereign interest in the preservation of its territory, supporting federal jurisdiction); id. 
(“Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected’ only 
reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete 
to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power.”); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573. 
53. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (citing Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 79); Id. at 
519–21; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Massachusetts, 
415 F.3d at 65 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“[The] EPA would presumably not bother with such 
efforts if it thought emissions reductions would have no discernable impact on future 
global warming.”). 
54. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (“[A]ny person may
commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the United 
States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency. . . [or] to compel the Secretary to 
apply . . . the prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to . . . this Act with respect 
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This conclusion is based on reasoned elaboration from existing arrangements,
and only goes so far as policy-discovery, merely expanding the doctrine 
of standing to an evolving modern problem.  This allows for vindication 
of the articulated (or arguably unarticulated) norm that climate change 
efforts need to be addressed and challenged in the courts where the 
Executive fails to follow Congress’s command.55  The Pragmatist would 
therefore concur in the judgment on this first question on standing. 
Where Pragmatism departs from the majority, however, is on the 
difference between an agency not enforcing a rule versus refusing to make 
a rule.56  That is not for the Court to decide as a matter of policy; Congress 
sets the limit of Administrative discretion and the President oversees its 
execution. Today, the Court engages in policy-making not delegated to 
nor constitutionally within its purview; Courts generally do not tell agencies 
how to obey statutes. A Pragmatist would therefore write separately to dissent 
on the merits. 
First, the Court in Massachusetts deviates from its own mandate as a 
neutral arbiter of Congressional and Executive policy.  Under the President’s
direction, the EPA is entrusted by Congress with creating and enforcing 
rules and regulations related to the reduction of air pollutants that endanger 
public health or welfare.57 The statute is void of permissible (or impermissible) 
reasons for which the EPA may defer judgment on a rulemaking petition.58 
There is no legitimacy behind the Court’s policy-making directives issued 
by the majority.  The EPA gave reasons enough for not wanting to decide
on Massachusetts’ petition.59 
to taking of any resident endangered species or threatened species . . . [or] against the
Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
55. See infra note 88; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120) (petitioners conceding that the Court need not decide 
the merits of climate change in order to find standing). 
56. Compare Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527 (“There are key difference between a 
denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement 
action. . . . Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though 
such a review is extremely limited and highly deferential.”) (internal quotations omitted); 
with id. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Where does the [Clean Air Act] say that the EPA 
Administrator is required to come to a decision on this question whenever a rulemaking 
petition is filed?  The Court points to no such provision because none exists.”) (emphasis 
added).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7521; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–46, Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120). 
58. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he statute says nothing 
at all about the reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a judgment—the 
permissible reasons for deciding not to grapple with the issue at the present time.”). 
59. Id. (“The reasons EPA gave are surely considerations executive agencies regularly
take into account . . . when deciding whether to consider entering a new field: the impact 
such entry would have on the Executive Branch programs and on foreign policy.”); id. at 
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Some, though not all, Pragmatists cannot agree with the conclusion that
the EPA rejected the rulemaking petition based on impermissible
considerations.60  The Administration provided justification for its inaction, 
namely that it could not with any certainty postulate that the proposed 
regulations would have the desired effect of curbing climate change.61 
Pragmatist jurists in particular favor yielding to the experts and trust the 
EPA in their determinations within their purview. If Congress wants to 
“force an agency’s hand,” it knows how to do so.62 
Second, the Court’s reliance on the Clean Air Act is misguided. The
policy considerations behind the Clean Air Act had nothing to do with 
climate change and everything to do with breathable air and the reduction 
of fluorocarbons and other airborne toxins.63  Nothing in the history of the
Clean Air Act pontificates on the need to curb the presumptuous causes 
of global warming.64 
The role of the EPA is to issue regulations as it sees fit in accordance
with the directives from Congress.  It is not the role of the Court to legislate 
based on policy considerations on matters delegated by the Legislature to 
the Executive.65  Although the Pragmatist is no stranger to validation of
policies, articulated or not, some would still firmly believe that today’s ruling 
goes too far. “Legislatures create policy, courts create law.”66 Whether a 
531–32 (“EPA finally argues that it cannot regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor
vehicles because doing so would require it to tighten mileage standards, a job that
Congress has assigned to [the Department of Transportation].”); id. at 533 (“EPA said . . .
that regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability to negotiate with ‘key
developing nations’ to reduce emissions.”) (citing Control of Emissions From New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68. Fed. Reg. 52, 931–32 (Sept. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 86)).
60. See id. at 534–35, 550–52. 
61. Id. at 553–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Control of Emissions From New
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68. Fed. Reg. 52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 86)). 
62. Id. at 550; see, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986). 
63. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 556–59; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 
42–48, 51–52, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120). 
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(f)(3); see also 42 U.S.C. supra note 2, §§ 7521, 7571, 7582,
7602, 7619. 
65. Massachusetts, 549 U.S at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This is a straightforward
administrative-law case, in which Congress has passed a malleable statute giving broad 
discretion, not to us, but to an executive agency”). 
66. ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 140 n.35 (2nd ed. 2005) (citing Neil Duxbury, Faith in 
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proposed rule is within the EPA’s purview limited by Congress may be 
justiciable as a matter of statutory interpretation.  However, whether the 
EPA should be forced to adjudicate proposed rules before they are ripe is 
a question of policymaking and deference should therefore be given to the 
agency.67  “Th[e] Court has no business substituting its own desired outcome 
for the reasoned judgment of a responsible agency.”68  The Executive’s 
role is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”69 As Justice Scalia
noted in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, “[The Court should] not enable the 
courts, with the permission of Congress, to ‘assume a position of authority 
over the governmental acts of another co-equal [branch of government].’ 
And [] become ‘virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness 
of Executive action.’”70  The separation of powers doctrine forbids what 
the majority commands. 
Pragmatists believe that a fair process is granted by our answer to
the standing question, thus concurring in that judgment alone because we
have evolved the law and given recourse through a procedural remedy that 
was previously foreclosed.  But pragmatism generally counsels against the 
Court’s indifference to the policy determinations of an executive agency.
Duly delegated the authority to adjudicate policy questions, the Executive 
is now second-guessed by the Court for want of a particularly desired
result. 
Pragmatists would dissent as to that conclusion. 
Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO LAW REV. 601, 
661 (1993).
67. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (“When a 
court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
with two questions. . . . If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, 
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’ If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency 
to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation.”) (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
68. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
69. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
70. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (first quoting Massachusetts 
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923); then quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984)); 
see also GORSUCH, supra note 34, at 61–69. 
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3. Judicial Nominalism 
The NOMINALIST JUSTICE, concurring:
Looking only towards what he/she “feels” is the right result, the
Nominalist looks only to one’s internal understanding of right and wrong.
When action is imperative, legalistic doctrines should not stand in the way 
of judicial will. The Legislature provided a means to an end and the Executive 
wishes to abdicate its duty and authority to see it through.  The judiciary
need not address the rule or precedent established here; the only matter of
any import is that the Court do right by the parties involved in the present
case, which makes the task before the bench an easy one. Although
capable of going either way, let us assume the Nominalist would concur 
completely with the majority and side with the environment, as legal realists
typically have done.
Nominalists are cynical and skeptical of all the rules and established law 
cited by more traditionalist jurists.71  Positivism and Pragmatism prefer 
the lethargic crutches of outmoded legal doctrines instead of the speed of 
their own legs.  American constitutional jurisprudence on the requirements 
of standing is as outdated as it is inflexible.  The Nominalist sees no reason 
to continue to apply some antiquated principle like standing when the 
right answer is clear. The majority believes the scientific data presented 
and the Nominalist is free to adopt or reject those factual assertions.  But 
why Justice Stevens bothers to cloak his true colors in some half-baked 
attempt to rationalize his reasoning about a State’s prerogatives and privileges 
is beyond the Nominalist’s comprehension; the Nominalist wishes that 
Justice Stevens would simply concede that all jurists, including himself, 
reason first with their emotion every time.  Every judge is a nominalist at
heart. The country needs to cut greenhouse gas emissions and if that means 
abandoning some ancient doctrine, “so be it.” 
The Nominalist would rule that Massachusetts or any other litigant 
joining the petition has legal standing to challenge the EPA.  If the Court
fails to find standing in this case, it will have to find it in another case,
unless it desires to abdicate its power to the same extent the EPA has
attempted to do here. The EPA had a job to do, and the Court should do
it for them as it sees fit. Furthermore, a Nominalist may forewarn the EPA 
71. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 102, 175 (commenting on legal realists’ fact-skepticism
and rule-skepticism and tendency to favor consequentialist approaches in judicial decision- 
making. The nominalist judges purely from the “gut” and seeks to find the “best result” 
only for the case sub judice). 
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that any failure to regulate in the future will warrant further judicial review 
and if the Court must micromanage the nuances of that agency to ensure
the best result in each case then that is what the Court should be prepared
to do.
As observed above, Judicial Nominalists have the philosophical temperaments
of legal realists. Nominalists reject the need for consistency in the law 
and arguably the “rule of law” in the conventional sense ceases to exist.  
Although doubtful of most universal facts and truths,72 the facts presented 
here (and the summary detailed by the Asymmetrical theorist below) 
make the case for protecting the climate clear.  There is the possibility the 
facts about climate change are wrong and the Nominalist’s concerns are 
entirely meritless. But it is surely better for judges to act when no action 
is needed than risk the consequences of a failure to act when the call of 
duty is imperative.  Even if judicial action proved to be ineffectual, the result 
is immaterial because justice demands the Court not sit idle when confronted 
with an opportunity for progress. 
The very prospect that a failure to judicially act on climate change could 
doom our species compels the Nominalist to concur.
B. Critical Theorist Perspectives 
In contrast to the three main traditional perspectives of judicial decision 
making, the critical theories require changing the datum and viewpoint of 
legal analysis.  The crux of critical theory is critically assessing the existing 
rule through the lens of the “outsider.” In short, the critical theorist will 
first deconstruct the existing rule or arrangement, and then reconstruct a 
remedy, based on the perspective of the “outsider.”  In the case discussed 
here, the environment, or some entity thereof, is the representative 
outsider. Each theorist will define the insider and outsider differently, and 
in so doing, effect the reconstruction of their perspective.  The remedy 
must then pass through four epistemology tests to evaluate its validity and 
sufficiency in answering the outsider’s source of subordination.73 
72. See id. at 174–83 (“[L]egal realism displays the predominant intellectual temperament 
of judicial nominalism . . . . [however] [j]udicial nominalism’s  normativity—its commitment 
to the best results in particular cases—is problematic.”). But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should 
be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the consequence would equally be the 
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”). 
73. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 243–55 (discussing the criticalist “way of knowing,” 
the truths and “hypertruths” each seeks to validate, and defining the rational/empirical, 
standpoint, postmodern, and positionality epistemologies). 
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1. Judicial Symmetry 
The SYMMETRICAL JUSTICE, concurring
The Symmetrical theorist would start with the existing rule: the issue 
here is about standing, whether a party possess the legal prerequisites that 
allow its claims to be recognized and adjudicated by our courts.  Standing 
is what makes a suit a “case or controversy.”74  Standing is vital; it is the
foundation upon which a party asserts its desire for relief.75  Without
standing, there is no recourse in the courts of law and equity.  In the 
Symmetrical theorist’s view, we must level this procedural playing field 
with a neutrally-minded rule.  Symmetricalists first determine if an existing 
arrangement (rule or law) is insider or outsider conscious.  In this regard, 
if a law is not neutral, then the disfavored party is subordinated by the law.  
Symmetricalists will then seek to remedy subordination with a facially 
neutral law.76 
An important assumption necessary for critical analysis, first requires
acceptance that Mother Earth is an outsider subordinated by the law and
by human history. Our entire legal system and notions of property law 
have deprived the entity that bore our existence from what is rightfully
hers and has served our human race’s advancement at her subordination. 
Her silence can no longer be condoned as assent to her own destruction.
She must be given an equal voice.  But, the Judiciary should not force an
Executive agency to act nor can judges micromanage interpretation of various
74. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“The critical question of ‘standing’ would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we 
fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal 
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, 
or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage. 
Contemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead 
to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.”). 
But see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
750–52 (1984).
75. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, MORALITY AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT, 35 (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2010) (2002) (“Standing, broadly 
understood, is the authority of someone to initiate an action.”). 
76. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 261–62 (“Applying the symmetrical equality model, 
the judge finds subordination if the matter under consideration is insider- or outsider-
consciousness . . . . Having found subordination, the judge then prescribes a facially 
neutral law to redress the identified subordination.”) (footnote omitted); see also Roy L. 
Brooks, “Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process,” 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 475, 481–83 (2003). 
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statutes, congressional directives, and agency regulations.77  And, it will
not always be the case where a State as noble as Massachusetts has the 
fortitude to effectuate litigation that gives the judicial branch the footing 
it requires to issue a remedy.  Our current concept of standing is antiquated 
and archaic in scope. The narrow framework of standing must be reconstructed 
to accommodate that which cannot pursue protection through litigation on 
its own behalf.  The Court must, therefore, expand the foundation of our 
idea of who, or what, has standing to bring a claim.78 
Consequently, the Symmetrical justice would differ from his colleagues
in the majority on the preliminary question of standing in that a symmetrical 
theorist would be convinced that the injury in fact applies equally to any 
human on Earth as it applies to Massachusetts.  Courts should not limit the 
standing of private individuals, nor the environment itself in seeking
redress from the judiciary. It may seem preposterous to grant inanimate 
objects the legal right to sue, but yet we give credence to the legal fiction 
of corporations.79  Courts allow every sect of minority person to have an 
identifiable perspective.80  Courts allow for the advocacy of children with 
or without their consent. Furthermore, courts appoint guardians for 
representation where they are due. 
The Symmetrical theorist would hold that the government and petitioners 
jointly appoint a guardian to be approved by this Court to represent Mother
Earth, who may file claims and seek injunctive, declaratory, or monetary
relief on her behalf, but who is simultaneously immune from suit as a
matter of law.81 
Similarly, the government is represented offensively by the Department
of Justice under the guidance of the Attorney General, and defensively by 
the Solicitor General.  Courts have long held that criminal defendants be 
77. See supra notes 50–70 and accompanying text. 
78. STONE, supra note 75, at 10–11, 49–70 (discussing the development of the “many
fronts of standing” in environmental law). 
79. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing the rights 
of corporations in America); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 
636 (1819) (the Marshall Court issuing a landmark decision solidifying the rights of 
private corporations in America over a century earlier); see also United States v. Deveaux, 
9 U.S. 61, 86 (1809); JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN 
MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 373–80 (New York: Riverhead Books) (2018). 
80. See Francisco Valdes, Theorizing “OutCrit” Theories: Coalitional Method and 
Comparative Jurisprudential Experience-RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1265, 1278–93 (1999). 
81. STONE, supra note 75, at 8–10 (discussing how “friends” of the environment can 
fulfill a plethora of duties that guardians generally perform, let alone provide legal representation); 
see also STONE, supra, text accompanying note 49 (noting how a single appointed guardian 
remedy would avoid the difficulty and complications of multiple jurisdictions granting 
guardians for a single entity). 
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appointed counsel and we provide the same through a compulsory process.82 
Minors and those adjudicated legally incompetent are appointed guardians 
to make decisions they are legally incapable of making.83 Corporations
have general counsel.84  Even the deceased and their eternal estates are
represented by executors.85  It is no stretch of the legal imagination to grant
legal standing to Earth via an appointed legal guardian, who may seek redress 
of wrongs on her behalf.86 
This holding would grant no more legal rights to the environment than 
those already endowed upon humans.  It merely levels the playing field 
and is insider-outsider neutral in that regard.  Finding that remedy satisfactory, 
the Symmetrical theorist would need not address the inner workings of
the EPA’s decision-making since this solution of equal standing is enough 
to create an equal process. 
This rule survives empirical and rational epistemology—the logical truth.
Logically, if a defect in the law caused a lack of standing to challenge a 
failure to regulate, then granting that standing is an appropriate remedy.  
The environment, and future generations of humanity,87 collectively, would
have a voice in a court of law where one did not exist before.  This neatly 
circumvents the Positivist’s concerns over particularized injury, as it appoints 
a single guardian to protect the interests of a collective injury, while minimizing 
the potential for vexatious litigation. 
This rule passes muster under standpoint epistemology—the truth of the 
outsider. The representative outsider, in this case the climate at large and
her inheritors, the future generations of unborn humans, the Amazon rainforest, 
and the birds of the air and the beasts of the field are all given a legal right 
that they did not have before.  If trees, the representative outsiders, could
speak, they would desire the legal standing to challenge EPA regulations 
that fail to curb greenhouse gas emissions and slow global warming.  In
82. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738 (1967).
83.  See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
84. See generally Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see also 
CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 64–66 (Green Books 
2d ed. 2011) (2002) (criticizing the legally fictitious creature called a corporation for having 
“too many rights” and “few responsibilities”). 
85. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1
(AM. LAW INST. 1986).
86. STONE, supra note 75, at 62–68 (first proposing the idea of guardianship for the 
environment).
87. See STONE, supra note 75, at 103–14 (discussing standing for future generations).
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particular, the representative outsiders benefit from this holding in that their 
interests in the EPA’s regulations under the Clean Air Act are now voiced. 
This last point demonstrates the limitations of a symmetrical holding
under postmodern epistemology, of which it fails to satisfy.  Postmodern 
epistemology validates the truth of every intersectionality of outsider. The
unrepresentative outsider is of course every fish of the sea and every lake
and river that does not or cannot benefit from a new greenhouse gas
regulation issued by the EPA under the Clean Air Act.  The Symmeticalist’s
remedy of guardianship-standing does nothing to better the plight of those 
species or sectors of the environment that suffer at the hands of toxic waste
contamination, poisoned ground-waters, or landfills.  Even at its maximum 
employment, this new rule is too narrow in its grant of a neutral procedural 
remedy that it fails to vindicate the interests of those ecosystems that would 
not benefit from a Clean Air Act regulation.  These injuries may be addressed 
in future litigation.  For now, the Symmetrical justice might justify his
holding by focusing on the parties directly affected by climate change and 
the injuries within the power of the EPA under the statute at issue here to 
amend.88  The Symmetrical theorist would accept the compromise of leaving
other environmental injuries by a failure to regulate under some other statute 
for some other day. 
Under positionality epistemology, the analysis goes beyond the mere 
truths of other epistemologies and considers only what are “permanent truths” 
or “hypertruths.”  The greatest hypertruth furthered by the Symmetricalist
would recognize that we are all part of the human race and this great 
organism that is our planet.  We must actively protect the planet if we are
to survive. Providing an advocate for a Living Being silenced for thousands of
years guarantees a new, fair process of living in symbiosis with our Mother 
Earth. Of course, this hypertruth stands in stark contrast to the values of
industry, capitalism, and society’s economic progress.  But, balancing the
two competing hyper truths in light of the existential question compels the 
only conclusion: our planet must win. 
Accordingly, the Symmetrical justice would concur in the judgment.
2. Judicial Asymmetry 
The ASYMMETRICAL JUSTICE, concurring
88. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007) (No. 05-1120) (conceding to Justice Kennedy that the Court need not decide the 
merits of climate change in order to find standing); see also id. at 4 (“We are not asking 
the Court to pass judgment on the science of climate change or to order EPA to set 
emission standards. We simply want EPA to visit the rulemaking petition based upon 
permissible considerations.”) (Petitioner’s counsel opening statement). 
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Rather than seeking an insider-outsider neutral solution, the Asymmetrical 
theorist wants to counterbalance the scales: as the majority notes, “the 
unusual importance of the underlying issue persuaded us to grant the 
writ.”89  “If carbon dioxide continues to increase, the study groups finds no 
reason to doubt that climate changes will result and no reason to believe 
that these changes will be negligible…. A wait-and-see policy may mean
waiting until it is too late.”90  We simply cannot wait. An Asymmetrical
theorist must concur only in the judgment, but for reasoning much more
critical of the existing law than her colleagues.
The Asymmetrical theorist would agree with the Symmetrical theorist 
that the court should address the existing structure of the law but would
see the severity of the subordination issue with greater clarity.
Asymmetricalists will find an existing arrangement subordinates outsiders 
if it adversely affects outsiders by either unconscious bias or insider 
privilege.91  “Insiderism” need not be intended by a law or rule; it can merely 
be an effect of unconscious bias.92 To the Asymmetricalist then, the relevant
outsider norms are the appropriate lens through which to perceive the 
subordination question.93  In the presence of outsider subordination, the
Asymmetricalist will fashion a remedy that grants preference to the 
outsiders to counter-balance the historical subordination.94  Affirmative
action is an example of Asymmetricalist doctrine.  The denial of the 
environment—Mother Earth—equal standing in a court of law exudes 
insiderism and cannot be corrected by merely granting equal rights.  A 
non-sentient being, such as our planet, can never be considered an equal
in the man-made creation that is the practice of law.95  No court could ever
give Mother Earth the equality she deserves.  After all, “there is no greater 
inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.”96 
89. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 506. 
90. Id. at 508 n.11.  But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 88. 
91. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 239 (“Subordination, or anti-objectivism, is established . . .
if a law or institutional practice negatively impacts outsiders and, . . . enhances or maintains 
insider privilege.”); see also id. at 262. 
92. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 240. 
93. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 262; see also id. at 246 (“those who have experienced
discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen”). 
94. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 261–64; see RUTH BADER GINSBURG ET AL., MY OWN
WORDS 245 (2016) (“I do not suggest that the Court should never step ahead of the political 
branches in pursuit of a constitutional precept.”). 
95. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 21, 55–61 (noting the dangers of humanity’s 
self-delusion that the “idea of law” justifies ignorance of Earth’s law). 
96.  Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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But the issue here is not just one of standing, because giving trees the 
right to sue does nothing if men do not take up the law in the environment’s 
defense. Trees should not have to rely on the continued subordination or 
selective representation that would come from being granted a legal right. 
That which hath born us is not subservient to rights humans grant; the
creation does not give the creator rights.  Earth has had natural rights since 
before the dawn of the human race.  We have just failed to recognize them 
in our indomitable exercise of self-serving dominion.
“The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.”97 
There has long been tension between environmentalists looking to mitigate
the consequences of economic development and the more aggressive
proponents of government-initiated climate change adaptation policy.98 
The effect of greenhouse gas emissions on global temperature rise and the 
disparate effects on sea levels are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
the devastating environmental impacts due to anthropological causes.99 
Based on the cause and effect relationship between emissions regulations 
(or lack thereof) and injury to the climate as a whole,100 the Asymmetrical
theorist would find the Court uniquely positioned to greatly influence the 
course of environmental propensities in our society.  An Asymmetricalist 
would not shy away from the opportunity to correct (even overcorrect) the 
subordination. 
Asymmetrical theorists would like to concur with Symmetrical’s proposed
holding, but he does not go far enough.  Guardians can be bought; they can 
be slovenly and lethargic and ineffective.  First, an Asymmetricalist would 
hold that any public or private entity has standing to petition the EPA.  As 
the positivist notes in his dissent, the majority’s reliance on Massachusetts’ 
sovereignty is foolish at best.101  The private organizations that make up
97. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521; J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the 
Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENV’T. L. REV. 363, 379–81 (2010) 
(explaining that climate change symptoms are well captured and consequences forecast). 
98. Ruhl, supra note 97, at 366–76, 378 (forecasting ten structural trends that are 
expected in environmental law as the field reacts to adaptation modes and policy 
pressures). 
99. Ruhl, supra note 97, at 379 nn.38–39 (citing numerous sources and volumes of 
research to show conclusively, among other determinations, that “air pollution control will 
accelerate warming in the coming decades,” and a positive feedback loop of lost plant life 
and melting tundra further increases production of net greenhouse gases). 
100. James E. Parker-Flynn, The Intersection of Mitigation and Adaptation in Climate
Law and Policy, 38 ENVIRONS ENV’T. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 2 (2014); see also id. at nn.1–12. 
101. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19. But see id. at 538–39 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s reliance on the state’s established authority over 
resources within its borders as an impetus to expand its alleged susceptibility to injury, 
including a rising sea level that impedes the use of its own land). 
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the vast bulk of the petitioners here are equally injured and seek an equal 
remedy and should therefore have equal standing.
Second, the Asymmetrical justice would not limit these suits to the
Clean Air Act.  She would grant standing for any claim for any failure to 
regulate under existing or future statutes related to environmental protection, 
not just for the statute addressed in this case.  The urgency of this existential 
problem demands this kind of action, and again, we have the opportunity
to reach all intersectionalites of the environment, and thus all outsiders to
this existing arrangement.
Thirdly, she would hold, as a matter of law, that the EPA is directed and 
obligated to use its authority to regulate emissions and slow the pace of 
climate change, in all suits and petitions against it, excepting only a narrowly 
tailored compelling state interest to do otherwise.102  The EPA would no
longer have discretion over instituting new regulations; it would be mandated 
to do so.  In any instance when a petition desires a new greenhouse gas cutting 
ordinance, the EPA will approve it.  The only redress for an affected entity 
is to seek review in the D.C. Circuit per the Clean Air Act and ultimately 
by appeal to the Court.  A compelling interest is of the most exacting 
constitutional standard.103  Here, the Asymmetrical justice demands that a
refusal to regulate must satisfy strict scrutiny.  Henceforth, an Asymmetrical 
justice would dictate the default rule is that new climate saving regulations 
will be granted when they are requested.  Combined with the newly granted 
standing addressed above,104 this holding would bring about drastic and
much needed social change and will end the subordination of the 
environment. 
To be clear: she does not believe this mandate comes from any
congressional statute nor is justified through legislative history.  Of course, the
Clean Air Act may have started movement in the right direction, but for
the wrong reasons. Those statutes, in the end, were self-serving to the human
race, whereas the Asymmetricalist’s ruling is based on redressing Earth’s
injury from humans since the Industrial Revolution.  The Asymmetrical 
102. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1973) (finding 
a compelling interest and a law narrowly tailored to that end is a judicial standard of strict 
scrutiny); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). 
103. Corso v. Fischer, 983 F. Supp. 2d 320, 333 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (“Strict 
scrutiny is usually the ‘death knell’ for the challenged regulation”) (citing Falwell v. 
Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (W.D. Va. 2002); Mood for a Day, Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 
953 F. Supp. 1252, 1262 n.12 (D. Utah 1995)). 
104. See supra notes 74–88 and accompanying text. 
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theorist purely relies on the norms expected by the environment if it could
speak for itself, and she merely grants the responsibility for addressing 
those concerns to the agency in our government most apt to fulfill them. 
“The lawn tells me it wants water by certain dryness of the blades of 
soil. . . .  We make decisions on behalf of, and in the purported interest of, 
other every day; these ‘others’ are often creatures whose wants are far less 
verifiable, and even far more metaphysical in conception, than the wants 
of rivers, trees, and land.”105 The Asymmetricalist would agree that the
Earth is communicating the symptoms of its injury to us by its reactions 
to increased atmospheric carbon dioxide, the induced effects of climate 
change and global warming. Make no mistake, this is an action of corrective 
policy and is in effect environmental affirmative action.  The situation 
calls for a transformation of the lens through which we view the law.106 
The Court must create a shield for Mother Earth out of the sword that has 
been used to enslave her lands, waters, and resources for centuries.107 
The context of this ruling necessitates that she defines the affected
groups. The symmetrical justice properly described the subordinated
outsiders as Mother Earth and all her children who suffer from a failure to 
regulate greenhouse gases.  The insiders, therefore, are the establishment 
and the government, which in themselves are merely representatives of 
the interests of corporations, the industrialists, the titans of business and 
our capitalist society at large.108  Their interests are ones of economy, in
plain contrast to the environment’s interest of survival. The rule the 
Asymmetrical justice crafts today will vindicate the norms of the outsider-
environment; to what expense on behalf of the insider-establishment is of 
no consequence to the Asymmetrical theorist. 
105. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); STONE, 
supra note 75, at 11 (Professor Stone asserting that natural objects in the environment can 
in fact speak for themselves). 
106. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 745 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (understanding the symptoms of
injury provides judges the norms through which to perceive the subordination). 
107. Thomas Berry, Forward to CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 19 (“This legal 
foundation . . . exalted the property-owning citizen beyond anything known previously in 
the history of political establishments. The difficulty is not exactly with the rights granted 
to humans; the difficulty is that no rights and no protections were granted to any non-
human mode of being.”). 
108. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 26–31; see also BERRY, Forward to CULLINAN, 
supra note 84, at 19 (“From its beginning the American Constitution was clearly a 
document framed for the advancement of the human with no significant reference to any 
other power in heaven or Earth. In the Bill of Rights, added as the first ten amendments, a 
detailed listing of the rights of individual persons was given.  Humans had finally become 
self-validating, both as individuals and as a political community. This self-validation was 
invented and sustained by the union of the commercial-entrepreneurial powers with the 
legal-judicial powers to sustain the assault on the natural world.”). 
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This holding is entirely rational from the climate’s perspective.  If given
the ability to craft its own remedy for its injury, the environment would 
certainly agree with an Asymmetricalist.109  Where at least one sentient 
human, one of Earth’s own, has the conscience to litigate on her behalf, a 
petition may at least be heard and by default a rule granted unless a 
compelling interest justifies otherwise.  The standard of strict scrutiny
serves to affirm the interests of the petitioners in the absence of a truly 
extraordinary (compelling) government interest.110 
The representative climate would readily accept this remedy and 
therefore this holding passes standpoint and postmodern epistemologies.
Mother Earth would welcome an EPA more attuned to meeting her needs 
on a consistent basis at the expense of the insiders who devised a system
effectuating her continued subordination. This holding also neatly corrects 
the limitations of the Symmetrical justice’s holding and applies to all 
intersectionalities of the environment, because I have broadened the scope 
of applicable statutes.  Some may think that by satisfying the norms of the
non-representative member of the environment, the standpoint epistemology
is no longer satisfied.  An Asymmetrical theorist would remain unpersuaded
that conflict requires her attention; given this set of circumstances and the 
breadth of this holding, Asymmetrical theorists care more about saving
the fish as well as the birds than to debate whether the latter would consider 
the former to have equal injury.
Like the symmetrical holding, under positionality this holding acknowledges 
and furthers the hypertruth of good stewardship of our planet.  Despite the 
relativity of truths between and amongst our race, the ultimate truth is
undeniable: without a home, the rest of our endeavors are forfeit to our
109. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 743 (Douglas, J., dissenting); See STONE, supra note 
75, at 11. 
110. STONE, supra note 75, at 17–22 (suggesting an effort should be made to afford 
non-human life representative and procedural rights and notes that Congress has done so 
in legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act. He also notes, however, that 
this and similar statutory measures generally limit the federal government’s footprint but 
does nothing to alter the conduct of private corporations.). 
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ignorance.  We must have an environment in which a civilization is capable 
of existing.111  “A wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late.”112 
The majority could have and should have done more.  The Asymmetrical jurist
can only concur in the judgment of the majority, but not the majority’s
reasoning. 
3. Judicial Hybridism 
The HYBRIDIST JUSTICE, concurring
The Hybrid critical theorist would agree with both Symmetrical and 
Asymmetrical colleagues to some extent.113  While the Symmetrical holding 
refused to address the decision-making of the EPA and resolved only the 
question of standing, the Asymmetrical ruling would instigate incalculable 
amounts of litigation114 and creates too exacting a standard for the EPA to 
exercise its discretion.  Where one party, say polar bears, loses a suit, and 
another party, sea lions, attempts to sue on the same facts and law, endless 
and vexatious litigation can occur. Courts will likely operate under “compulsory 
joinder” rules in order to eliminate these complications.  Hybridists do not 
see a need to be as drastic as Asymmetricalists in their reconstructions.  
They seek only to neutralize insider power, not vanquish it. 
Hybridists would concur with the Symmetrical holding on guardianship
and would add a requirement that the EPA provide a decision on a petition, 
justifying all rejections with a substantial government interest within 180
days of its filing.  Hybridists would also agree with the second Asymmetrical 
holding, regarding the broadening of the case at hand to include all 
environmental regulations, not just those under the Clean Air Act.  The 
proposed test of strict scrutiny, however, requiring a compelling interest 
is rarely if ever, satisfied,115 whereas the Hybridist compromise of a proposed
111. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 157–66; see also id. at 138–45 (arguing for
“transformation in law and governance” and articulates a new philosophy of law call 
“Earth jurisprudence.” This includes rethinking the most basic of concepts such as property 
law.); see also id. at 7–10 (focusing on an “earth-centric perspective of law and regulation.”). 
112. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 508, note 11 (citing Climate Research Board, Carbon
Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment vii, viii (1979)). 
113. See BROOKS, supra note 66, at 264, 265 (Hybridists follow the deconstruction
(question of subordination) of Asymmetricalists but follow the reconstruction (proposed 
remedy) of Symmetricalists. Hybrid prefers rules that find the golden mean and neutralize 
insider power while not committing reciprocal subordination.) 
114. STONE, supra note 75, at 68 (noting under a scheme like Asymmetrical’s the 
“potential collateral effects of litigation,” like res judicata could be maladaptive to progress.); 
see STONE, supra note 75. 
115. See Parker-Flynn, supra note 100; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1302–06 (2007) (Regarding strict scrutiny as effectively 
a categorical bar, noting despite “Gerald Gunther’s much-quoted remark that strict scrutiny is 
‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,’ the Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that strict 
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standard of intermediate scrutiny is more reasonable and does not unduly 
prejudice against insiders.116 
The Hybridist would likely echo the Symmetricalist’s analysis of
guardianship holding under the critical epistemologies and will not repeat
them here. Only note that a Hybridist would support this measure because 
it attempts to find a mean between the human-insider and non-human-
outsider.  Similarly, the Hybridist would concur the Asymmetricalist’s
analyses of the broadening of applicable statutes and will not rehash that
analysis. What follows is only an application of critical epistemologies to
the third Hybridist holding, the mitigating of strict scrutiny to intermediate 
scrutiny.
The intermediate scrutiny holding passes rational and empirical epistemology. 
The default ruling of the EPA will still be in favor of a new environmental-
friendly regulation and a substantial interest must otherwise overrule the
regulation and its benefits. Relative to the Asymmetricalist’s compelling 
interest standard, and although disfavored, the hybridist intermediate standard
still provides a reasonable means of protecting the environment without 
overburdening the insider interests. This, in the Hybridist’ view, allows for
societal, industrial, and technological advancement while still providing 
adequate redress to the environment. 
This holding over intermediate scrutiny would not pass under standpoint 
or postmodern epistemologies.  Arguably, if the climate could speak, it
would desire most to regulate itself altogether without interference from 
its most-sentient species.  As such, under any rule where humans have the 
final say over the impact to the whole planet, the best interests of the environment 
are furthered by the most minimal interaction possible.117  We are forever 
beyond that remedy.  Many Hybridists would remain not confident that a 
proper balance can be struck as a matter of law that will truly vindicate 
scrutiny will permit infringements of preferred rights only to avert rare, catastrophic
harms.”). 
116. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that intermediate scrutiny only requires a 
substantial government interest and the law must be “not more extensive than necessary 
to serve that interest.”) (quoting id. at 566 (majority opinion)); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982). 
117. Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla & Louis J. Kotzé, Living in Harmony with
Nature? A Critical Appraisal of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia, 7:3 TRANSNAT’L 
ENV’T L., 397, 398 (2018) (“In the anthropocentric ethic, humans consider themselves the 
dominant and most important life form; non-human lives are important only insofar as 
they are useful for maintaining the position of humans at the top of the social hierarchy.”). 
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the norms of the environment.  But, in any event, neutralizing the power 
of the industrial establishment is a suitable compromise. 
Positionality is validated by the third part of the holding, however.  In
the balancing of hypertruths, the hybridist holding validates the immediate 
need to protect the environment while not completely disavowing the 
interests of humanity.  But in the end, this holding still upholds the great 
overarching value in our jurisprudence in this case: the promotion of one 
earth, one planet, and one world.118 
C. Commentary 
The current political climate (pun intended) in 2020 is littered with
discussions of green energy and the need to curb the causes and effects of
climate change.  This Comment was first written to explore the juridical 
methods and judicial techniques of traditionalist and criticalist philosophies
as applied to environmental law and the Court’s perspective on the issue
of global warming in Massachusetts. 
The majority’s opinion, written by Justice Stevens, holds for the first
time that a State has standing to petition the EPA for a regulation that
could remedy an injury to that sovereign’s shores.  Some view this reach 
of judicial power as the Court injecting itself into the political arena. Justice 
Stevens furthermore holds the EPA responsible for fulfilling its congressional 
mandate by forcing regulation of greenhouse gases. Those who accuse the 
Court of activism would say this is a “political question”119 left to the other
two branches of government. 
The traditionalists confine their rulings to existing structures of law.
Justice Positivism sides with Chief Justice Roberts and refuses to recognize
the claim against the EPA for lack of standing by Massachusetts, relying 
on the precedent and existing rules regarding constitutional standing 
118. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 122–30; see also id. at 128 (“Accepting the 
premises of Earth jurisprudence has fundamental implications for the study of jurisprudence, 
law and governance. Currently we learn about jurisprudence and law in law libraries and 
lecture theaters from which nature is meticulously excluded. From an Earth-centered 
perspective, this means that we are devising our legal philosophies and laws without 
reference to the ‘primary texts’ (i.e., nature) and seeking answers in libraries that do not 
contain those answers.”). 
119. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any 
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the 
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of 
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”). 
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requirements.  Justice Pragmatism finds no qualms with assenting to the
majority’s finding of standing as a policy-discovery measure but refuses 
to violate the separation of powers doctrine by mandating how an executive
agency chooses to regulate.  Justice Nominalism applies his own standard 
of wisdom and calls this an easy case based on his own gut-feelings on 
the necessity of combatting climate change. 
The Criticalist justices break the structure and restrictions of conventional 
statutory and precedent-bound methods of interpretation.120 Justice Symmetrical
adopts Professor Stone’s concept of guardianship as an acceptable means 
of providing equal standing.  Justice Asymmetrical prefers granting standing 
to any entity capable of providing guardianship, expands the scope of 
applicable statutes, and counterbalances the scales by creating an exacting 
standard for insiders to overcome should they desire to challenge a new 
regulation. Justice Hybrid splits the difference, favoring Asymmetrical’s 
deconstruction and Symmetrical’s reconstruction by neutralizing insider 
power with an intermediate scrutiny standard for insiders, while preventing 
vexatious litigation via appointed guardianship. 
It seems, therefore, that Justice Hybrid best supports diversity and 
inclusion.121  While Asymmetrical validates outsider norms the most, the
remedy is too extreme and arguably unworkable for a modern society.  
The only standard beyond strict scrutiny is an absolute standard. Hybrid, 
on the other hand, provides a means of redress that covers all intersectionalities 
of outsiders, provides for equal access to the process, and still succeeds to 
include a way that the human-insider can effectuate economic and industrial 
progress.
Throughout the development of critical theory, on numerous occasions 
the criticalist perspectives eventually became governing law.122  Although
120. See BROOKS, supra note 66, at 211–25, 308 (explaining central to Critical Theory is
the tenant of anti-objectivism. Anti-objectivism, as a basic assumption, presumes that the 
existing legal framework, created by privileged insiders, is inherently biased, either 
consciously or unconsciously. Criticalists rely on anti-objectivism as the foundation for 
reasoning that seeks to validate outsider norms and perspectives in an imperfect and 
historically subordinating structure of existing law. Without subordination, there is no 
critical process to undergo.). 
121. See GINSBURG, supra note 94, at 268–76 (discussing the “value of diversity”.). 
122. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (dawn of the Civil 
Rights Era); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (promoting associated statutes that were 
enacted in the years following Brown); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
(allowing equal educational opportunities for women); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(vindicating feminist norms and women’s right to elect pregnancy termination). 
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primarily enacted through statutes after landmark cases, this trend demonstrates 
society’s progressive desire to recognize shifting values and norms towards
outsider perspectives. The present case is no different. 
Professor Stone’s seminal work cited passim was published in 1972.
Professor Nash and Fr. Berry published works on the Rights of Earth in 
1989 and 2001, respectively. Cullinan’s Wild Law cited passim was published 
in 2003.  In the mid-2000s, the Community Environmental Legal Defense 
Fund assisted in drafting the Rights of Nature approved by a town council, 
the first instance of recognized Rights of Nature in law.  In September
2008, the people of Ecuador voted in a referendum to amend the Constitution 
of Ecuador, creating the first constitution recognizing the rights of Mother 
Earth.123  In April of 2010, the Bolivian people proclaimed a Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and codified it into law in 
2012.124 
In 2011, the first lawsuit over the Rights of Nature was adjudicated in
Ecuador. The named plaintiff was a river that defended itself from a project 
that would affect its health.  In 2014, New Zealand’s Parliament recognized 
that a former park of 2000 square kilometers had “legal recognition in its 
own right.”125  In 2017, Columbia recognized similar rights in a river.  In
2017, Mexico City amended its constitution and the city of Lafayette, CO, 
enacted the first Climate Bill of Rights, both codifying the legal rights of 
nature.126 On October 17, 2019, The Democratic Party of Florida adopted 
the Rights of Nature into its party platform.127 
123. See República del Ecuador Constitucion de 2008 January 31, 2011, tit. II, ch. 7, 
art. 71–74; Calzadilla & Kotzé, supra note 117, at 398–99. 
124. Calzadilla & Kotzé, supra note 117, at 397, 399–404, 406–07.  Id. at 400
(“[W]hile there seems to be no easy answer to such profound contradictions and
complexities that overshadow the idealistic promise and potential of juridically innovative 
ways to safeguard Earth system integrity, the rights of nature debate and its practical 
manifestation in legal systems such as that of Bolivia provide considerable opportunities 
to begin with a much needed re-imagination of law and its ability to protect nature.”). See 
John Vidal, Bolivia Enshrines Natural World’s Rights with Equal Status for Mother Earth, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/10/ 
bolivia-enshrines-natural-worlds-rights [https://perma.cc/KS59-LYWF]; Timeline of Articles 
on the Rights of Nature, GLOB. ALL. FOR RIGHTS OF NATURE, https://therightsofnature.org/ 
timeline/ [https://perma.cc/H5LA-FT7Q]; CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 183–91.
 125. Calzadilla & Kotzé, supra note 117, at 398–99 nn.11, 12; Whanganui River Deed 
of Settlement Between the Crown and Whanganui Iwi, https://www.govt.nz/assets/
Documents/OTS/Whanganui-Iwi/Whanganui-Iwi-Whanganui-River-Deed-of-Settlement- 
Summary-5-Aug-014.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6FN-QXNM] (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). 
126.  See Timeline of Articles on the Rights of Nature, GLOB. ALL. FOR RIGHTS OF 
NATURE, https://therightsofnature.org/timeline/ [https://perma.cc/H5LA-FT7Q]. 
127. MEDIA STATEMENT: FLORIDA DEMOCRATS ADOPT RIGHTS OF NATURE IN PARTY 
PLATFORM (OCT. 15, 2019), https://celdf.org/2019/10/media-statement-florida-democrats-
adopt-rights-of-nature-in-party-platform/ [https://perma.cc/6T6T-2LBY]. 
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We are all inhabitants of our Mother Earth. We are all included as
beneficiaries in the solution to global warming.  Every race, creed, and 
nationality benefits from the sustainment of our planet and preservation 
of biodiversity and global temperature.128  Under any of the Criticalist holdings,
minority groups, the underprivileged, underrepresented minorities which 
have been subordinated by the corporate-elite backed legal system have a 
mode of redress on behalf of their planet.  Industries and corporations driving 
for profits who manipulate the system can no longer avoid the piercing cries 
of the indigent and the young, nor the Earth that they have ravaged for its 
resources. Every intersectionality of life on Earth, human, animal, plant, 
ecosystem, and climate included, is given a voice. 
In all reality, I think courts would be reluctant to further this line of 
judicial decision-making. The justification of the process here, the means
to the end, opens the proverbial door to an unbounded, unrestricted potential 
for future “cases and controversies” not previously sustainable.  Broadening 
the definition of standing to the degree the Criticalist’s advocate may
create an impetus to recognize other collective, amorphous associations 
that cannot satisfy the traditional requirements of injury, causation, and 
redressability.  The result may include far-reaching implications and expansive
judicial power to adjudicate more than a case or controversy.  Let us consider 
the possible extremes of such a holding.129 
If the environment is considered an outsider and a compilation of
inanimate objects is now given the legal effect of standing, why then should we
not give voices to groups whose injuries in more conventional claims are 
just as attenuated and imprecise?  For instance, the millennial generation
has mounting student loan debt.  The current, collective college loan debt
128. See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Conference of the Parties for 2012, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (Feb. 28, 2013), 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L5JZ-4J2X]; see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Conference of the Parties for 2013, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2013), 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
LJ7D-QJVB].
129. See Calzadilla and Kotzé, supra note 117, at 424 (stating “The key challenge in
this respect would be to reconcile as far as possible such radical worldviews with the prevailing, 
more conventional Western, often Eurocentric and predominantly anthropocentric, visions 
of law that form the basis of most legal systems the world over. We would need to open 
ourselves as lawyers, politicians and academics, among many other role players, to these 
alternative, potentially progressive, and possibly more effective juridical framings that 
focus on preserving Earth system integrity.”). 
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tops $1.5 trillion spread over some 40 million Americans.130 In most cases, 
predatory lending led to the legalized leveraging of college debt on the 
generationally-backed value that college education is a right and everyone 
should secure a loan for financing.  But now the value of the individual degree 
has decreased due to the increase in supply. College graduates are having 
a harder time finding jobs that will pay commensurate with their education.  
Many millennials have tight cash flow, will work well into retirement years 
to pay back loans, and may scrap together just enough savings to live on. 
There has been a call for a debt jubilee. 
If a court were so activist as to recognize a new judicial power to protect 
the environment, it may be equally as likely to invalidate loan contracts 
(even on a more traditional contract excuse such as unconscionability) and
void all student debts for an entire generation of student-outsiders who 
were subordinated by the laws that protect lenders and universities.  While 
some would hail such a decision, the second and third order effects are 
too immense to measure. The lost capital in the banking industry would 
undoubtedly cripple some financial institutions.  That debt is still an asset
on the balance sheets of banks, on which investors rely for the preservation 
of capital. In order to mitigate future risks, banks would force disclosure 
from all future loan applicants as to the status of the applicant’s prior student
loans. Interest rates would increase due to the need to hedge against more
risky loans in the future and to make up for losses, and so on.  A ruling 
such as this would be possible under a Criticalist theory looking to vindicate 
millennial generational norms, where “collective standing” could be justified
on the same grounds that gave the environment standing, because “particularized, 
imminent injuries” fall under a now broadened scope of interpretation. 
Another, arguably larger example is the insolvency of Social Security. 
Under the process condoned by the Criticalists, an activist court could 
effectively invalidate social security.  Congress has already had to raise the 
retirement age. What is stopping a court from simply striking down social 
security mandatory payments in order to reprieve the nation’s balance 
sheet? Social security and other entitlements make up 52% of the national 
budget and the total unfunded debt liabilities by governments in the 
United States is $25 trillion.131  Without infringing on the debt or interest 
owed foreign powers or bond holders, the Court could simply provide for 
a nullification of social security obligations.  The elderly will no longer be 
130. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Research and Statistics Group, Q2 Q. REP. ON 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/
householdcredit/data/pdf/hhdc_2019q2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSY5-6R7Z].
131. CHRISTOPHER CHANTRILL, U.S. GOVERNMENT SPENDING (Oct. 10, 2020), https:// 
www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal deficit [https://perma.cc/B6QQ-P69U].
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paid, but the young will have greater cash flow and half the US national
debt will evaporate.
In the evolving financial nature of the country, a Court could consider 
the young and unborn future generations as outsiders, unfairly born and 
raised into a pay-as-you-go system of debt that they never consented to. 
If an entity as amorphous as the climate can articulate standing, why not
the collective unborn, future generations?  If the Court finds standing in such
an instance and finds it simply untenable and unconscionable to allow the 
past generations to burden the future generations with shouldered debt, the
Court could, in theory, wipe it out. Such a finding, possible with broadened
applications of constitutional standing, are within the scope of Criticalist
corrective remedies.
In the case of Massachusetts, the second and third order effects of over-
regulating industrial and economic sectors could have drastic implications 
for the human standard of living. Transitioning off fossil fuels for power 
and transportation before we have sustainable alternative sources of energy 
will undoubtedly have adverse and nation-threatening effects on commerce 
and society’s stability.  Whether considering the loan forgiveness, judicially 
mandated entitlement reform, or judicial fiat on greenhouse gas emissions, 
the Court would effectively assert all the authority reserved to the Legislature 
and Executive. Even under Justice Symmetrical’s moderate holding requiring 
a guardian, judicial review would become a process for unprecedented 
policy-making beyond the scope of the judicial function.132  Disregard of 
constitutional and statutory limitations in a radical attempt to effect change 
through unbridled re-interpretation is a dangerous and powerful precedent, 
and many believe this type of reasoning can only lead to judicial usurpation 
and tyranny.133 
132. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he judiciary, from the nature of
its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; 
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses 
the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands 
the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to 
be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the 
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no 
active resolution whatever.  It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy 
of its judgments.”). 
133. Id. (“[The judiciary] can never attack with success either of the other two
[branches] . . . though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of 
justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered . . . so long as the judiciary 
remains truly distinct from both the [L]egislature and the Executive. . . . ‘[T]here is no 
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Having considered the extremes and by re-orienting the problem in the 
frame of judicial construction, prudence dictates the People remain sovereign 
through the democratic process and put the pressure on their elected
legislature to act in accordance with their will.  A Climate Protection Act or 
Climate Change Prevention Act is not beyond the scope of the legislature to 
enact. Moreover, as noted in the introduction, Congress has the authority to
statutorily provide a cause of action against an agency to redress injuries. 
Where Congress provides a remedy and recognizes an injury, courts
would be more likely to find a case or controversy.134 
The key to balancing any issue is moderation, which is what environmentalists 
have arguably called for over the past half-century.  But they also (validly)
point out that the longer we wait to moderate, the harder the moderation
must be to effectuate a meaningful correction.  And the question remains, 
who decides when and how to balance the scales.  There is the possibility
that even despite a Congressional mandate, a stalwart agency or court may 
refuse to recognize a cognizable injury to the environment.  But, I have great
faith in the moderate pace of change that our system permits.
However, I must concede that there is one great counter-argument to 
the two extreme hypothetical examples posed above: the question in the 
case sub judice is an existential one, beyond the concept of property, the 
reach of statutes, and the structure of the Constitution.  We are talking about 
survival. The seemingly inescapable gravity that threatens the continued 
existence of our society and species compels action.  Humanity cannot
wait; without the human race there is no need for human law.  Perhaps, as
the scholars cited passim suggest, the time has come to abandon traditional 
doctrines like constitutional standing.  Perhaps, we should rethink the very 
structure of our jurisprudence.135  The case below illustrates.
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ . . .
[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to 
fear from its union with either of the other departments[.]”).  See also, Antonin Scalia, 
“Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts 
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 39, 42 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1997); GINSBURG, supra note 94, at 229–30. 
134. See Massachusetts v. EPA, Oral Arguments, supra note 46, at 40:14-41:5
(Respondent responding to Chief Justice Roberts’s question regarding whether a statute 
conferring a cause of action can necessarily vitiate standing saying: “Congress could make 
findings with respect to causation or other issues that this Court would have to give 
deference to and seriously consider, but [the Chief Justice is] right. It would not override 
the requirements of Article III.”). 
135. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 170 (“If we are to halt and reverse the process 
of degrading Earth we must completely revise how we govern ourselves. . . . [W]e must 
reject the misperception that humans are separate from Earth.”); see also id. at 177 (“‘[T]he 
environment’ cannot be adequately dealt with simply by creating a new category of 
environmental law. Ultimately, all law must be based upon and reflect Earth jurisprudence, 
as must all institutional structures of our societies.”). 
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III. JULIANA V. UNITED STATES136 
In 2018, several plaintiffs, many of them teenagers and young adults 
concerned about climate change, filed a lawsuit in federal court against 
the United States government.137 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
from to compel the federal government to curb CO2 emissions.138  The 
district court concluded, “the plaintiffs had standing to sue, raised justiciable 
questions, and stated a claim for infringement of a Fifth Amendment due 
process right to a ‘climate system capable of sustaining human life.’”139 
Despite a voluminous record,140  the Ninth Circuit reversed, 2 to 1.141 
Writing for the majority, Circuit Judge Hurwitz conceded the first two 
prongs of standing, causation and injury, but ruled the plaintiffs failed to
allege redressability: they failed to show how a favorable judicial ruling 
136.  Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2020). 
137. See id.
 138. Id. at 1166 (“The operative complaint accuses the government of continuing to
“permit, authorize, and subsidize” fossil fuel use despite long being aware of its risks, thereby 
causing various climate-change related injuries to the plaintiffs. Some plaintiffs claim 
psychological harm, others impairment to recreational interests, others exacerbated medical 
conditions, and others damage to property. The complaint asserts violations of: (1) the 
plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; 
(2) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment to equal protection of the law; (3) the 
plaintiffs’ rights under the Ninth Amendment; and (4) the public trust doctrine. The plaintiffs 
seek declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to 
“phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].” 
(alteration original)). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1166 (“The plaintiffs have compiled an extensive record . . . [that] leaves 
little basis for denying that climate change is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace. . . . 
[S]ince the dawn of the Industrial Age, atmospheric carbon dioxide has skyrocketed to 
levels not seen for almost three million years. . . . Today, it is over 410 parts per million 
and climbing. . . . Copious expert evidence establishes that this unprecedented rise stems 
from fossil fuel combustion and will wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if unchecked. 
Temperatures . . . may rise more than 6 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. . . . This 
extreme heat is melting polar ice caps and may cause sea levels to rise 15 to 30 feet by 
2100. The problem is approaching ‘the point of no return. . . .’ [T]he federal government 
has long understood the risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions. 
As early as 1965, the Johnson Administration cautioned that fossil fuel emissions threatened 
significant changes to climate, global temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric 
properties. In 1983, an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) report projected an 
increase of 2 degrees Celsius by 2040, warning that a ‘wait and see’ carbon emissions policy 
was extremely risky. . . . Nonetheless, by 2014, U.S. fossil fuel emissions had climbed. . . 
from 1965. This growth shows no signs of abating. . . . [T]he country is now expanding 
oil and gas extraction four times faster than any other nation.”). 
141. Id. at 1175. 
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would actually lead to reduced CO2 emissions and beneficial environmental 
impact.142  The majority further stated such an incursion on policy-
determinations would violate the separation of powers doctrine, noting the 
democratic branches are the appropriate vehicles for policy change.143 
However, District Judge Staton, sitting by designation, dissented.144  Judge 
Staton’s opinion rejected the confines of standing and instead embraced a 
new principle: “Plaintiffs bring suit to enforce the most basic structural 
principle embedded in our system of ordered liberty: that the Constitution 
does not condone the Nation’s willful destruction.”145  Judge Staton expounds 
on this “perpetuity principle.”  Although the question here is existential, 
she does not limit its reach to solely environmental matters.146 Specifically
142. Id. at 1170 (“The crux of the plaintiffs’ requested remedy is an injunction
requiring the government not only to cease permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing fossil 
fuel use, but also to prepare a plan subject to judicial approval to draw down harmful 
emissions. The plaintiffs thus seek not only to enjoin the Executive from exercising 
discretionary authority expressly granted by Congress . . . an order simply enjoining those 
activities will not, according to their own experts’ opinions, suffice to stop catastrophic 
climate change or even ameliorate their injuries. The plaintiffs’ experts opine that the 
federal government’s leases and subsidies have contributed to global carbon emissions. 
But they do not show that even the total elimination of the challenged programs would halt the 
growth of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, let alone decrease that growth. . . . 
Rather, the record shows that many of the emissions causing climate change happened 
decades ago or come from foreign and non-governmental sources.”). 
143. Id. at 1172.  “[T]his kind of plan will demand action not only by the Executive, 
but also by Congress. Absent court intervention, the political branches might conclude . . . 
that economic or defense considerations called for continuation of the very programs challenged 
in this suit, or a less robust approach to addressing climate change than the plaintiffs 
believe is necessary. ‘But we cannot substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s [or 
Legislature’s] predictive judgments on such matters . . .’” (alterations original, citations 
omitted). 
144. Id. at 1175 (Staton, District Judge, dissenting). 
145. Id. at 1175–76 (“[P]laintiffs’ claims adhere to a judicially administrable standard.
And considering plaintiffs seek no less than to forestall the Nation’s demise, even a partial 
and temporary reprieve would constitute meaningful redress. Such relief, much like the 
desegregation orders and statewide prison injunctions the Supreme Court has sanctioned, 
would vindicate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights without exceeding the Judiciary’s province.”); 
see id. at 1182 (“[P]laintiffs have a constitutional right to be free from irreversible and 
catastrophic climate change.”) (comparing due process rights annunciated in Brown v. Board 
and Furman v. Georgia). 
146. Id. at 1179 (“This perpetuity principle does not amount to “a right to live in a 
contaminant-free, healthy environment.” . . . be sure, the stakes can be quite high in 
environmental disputes, as pollution causes tens of thousands of premature deaths each 
year, not to mention disability and diminished quality of life. Many abhor living in a polluted 
environment, and some pay with their lives. But mine-run environmental concerns “involve a 
host of policy choices that must be made by . . . elected representatives, rather than by 
federal judges interpreting the basic charter of government[.]” . . . The perpetuity principle 
is not an environmental right at all, and it does not task the courts with determining the 
optimal level of environmental regulation; rather, it prohibits only the willful dissolution 
of the Republic.”)  (internal citations omitted). 
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disagreeing with the majority on the third prong of the standing requirements,
Judge Staton relies on Massachusetts v. EPA to find that the redressability
element is satisfied, as “some” reduction of CO2 is a quantifiable redress.147 
But, in  deriving a Due Process right for the individual to live in a non-
cataclysmic climate, Judge Staton neatly side-steps the “special solicitude” 
the State of Massachusetts enjoyed, expanding Massachusetts even further 
than Justice Stevens had imagined.148  Besides, standing doctrine, like
other justiciability doctrines, is often used solely for courts to decide which 
cases they want to hear and which issues they would rather refrain from 
addressing.  Judge Staton criticized the majority’s rigid adherence to 
the separation of powers, calling the doctrine “deference-to-a-fault” when 
“yielding” to the political branches will “walk the Nation over a cliff.”149 
What Brown was for segregation, this case could have been for climate
change.150 
At a minimum, Judge Staton is a far-flung Pragmatist, believing that 
“faithful application of our history and precedents reveals that a failure to 
[confront and reconcile the tension between separation of powers and 
judicial review] leads to the wrong result.”151  But, unless the words of her 
opinion cloak a subtext of environmentalism that goes undetected, she is 
not employing any critical environmental perspectives.  Although her 
deconstruction follows that of the Asymmetrical critical theorist, she does 
not offer a reconstructive remedy so radical as to embody a true critical 
theorist; she does not offer any analysis on the perspective of the environment 
147. Id. at 1182 (“[A] non-negligible reduction in emissions—there, by regulating vehicles 
emissions—satisfie[s] the redressability requirement of Article III[.]”). 
148. Id. at 1183 nn.8, 9; see id. at 1187 (“[W]e need not definitively determine that
standard today. Rather, we need conclude only that plaintiffs have submitted sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether such an amount can possibly be 
determined as a matter of scientific fact.”) 
149. Id. at 1184 (“[T]he doctrine of judicial review compels federal courts to fashion
and effectuate relief to right legal wrongs, even when . . . it requires that we instruct the 
other branches as to the constitutional limitations on their power. Indeed, sometimes ‘the 
[judicial and governance] roles briefly and partially coincide when a court, in granting 
relief against actual harm that has been suffered, . . . orders the alteration of an institutional 
organization or procedure that causes the harm.’” (citation omitted)). 
150. Id. at 1188–89; see id. at 1191 (“And while all would now readily agree that the 
91 years between the Emancipation Proclamation and the decision in Brown v. Board was 
too long, determining when a court must step in to protect fundamental rights is not an 
exact science.”). 
151. See id. at 1184 (illustrating that pragmatists are consequentialists and often
concerned primarily about the results of their decisions.). 
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as an outsider.  At the extreme, the good Judge may be a Nominalist at heart 
in that she is most concerned with the enforcement of her own values and 
feelings as to what is “right.” 
IV. CONCLUSION
The dissent’s conclusion is rooted in legal realism and is ironically
and particularly unnerving.  Judge Staton’s reasoning is more expansive 
of judicial power than a critical theorist in that it is not limited solely to 
the environmental issue.  It lays the groundwork for the hypotheticals I 
posed above: if the Court can dream up a Due Process right under the Fifth 
Amendment to live in a climate-change-free environment, what new 
rights-to-be-created would exceed the newfound scope of judicial power?
Furthermore, if the Court can re-legislate for Congress and compel the 
Executive to act in accordance with judicial decree to the extent the Juliana 
dissent proposes, there is some merit to the proposition that our democratic
elections would become empty ceremonies. Some may pontificate that the
sole purpose of future elections may be only to impeach unelected judges.
Then again, throughout human history, the times have presented decision
points that demand employment of that exclusive quality of our human race: 
Leadership. Perhaps the need to stop climate change is such a moment. 
Perhaps leaders are sometimes found in black robes. 
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